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A. Use of Citizen Suits to Pursue Legacy Litigation1 
 
In Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P.,2a landowner filed suit seeking 




†Campanile Charities Professor of Energy Law, Director of Mineral Law Institute, 
1 East Campus Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808, khall@lsu.edu. This paper 
discusses legislative and judicial developments relevant to Louisiana oil and gas law 
for the first three quarters of 2019. 
    1.  In Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So.3d 234, 238 n.1 (La. 2010), the 
Louisiana Supreme Court stated: “Legacy litigation” refers to lawsuits in which 
“Legacy litigation” refers to hundreds of cases filed by landowners seeking damages 
from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged environmental damage in the 
wake of this Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa Production, 850 So.2d 686 (La. 
2003). These types of actions are known as “legacy litigation” because they often 
arise from operations conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted “legacy” 
in the form of actual or alleged contamination. (citing Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy 
Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL. ENVT. L.J. 347, 34 (Summer 2007)). 
    2.  Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., 2019 WL 1230944 (W.D. La.).  
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to his purchase of the property.  The landowner previously had filed a 
suit seeking a clean-up based on the defendants’ obligations under the 
Louisiana Mineral Code.  That earlier suit was dismissed based on the 
subsequent purchaser doctrine.3  The subsequent purchaser doctrine 
states that private claims for damages to property belong to the person 
who owned the property at the time of the damages and absent that 
person’s assignment of his claims to a subsequent purchaser of the 
property, the subsequent purchaser does not have a claim against the 
person who caused the damages.4 
In the current suit, the landowner seeks injunctive relief—in 
particular, an order requiring a remediation—in a citizen suit brought 
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:14 and 30:16.  Revised 
Statute 30:14 states in part:  
 
Whenever it appears that a person is violating or is 
threatening to violate a law of this state with respect to 
the conservation of oil or gas, or both, or a provision of 
this Chapter, or a rule, regulation, or order made 
thereunder, the commissioner shall bring suit to 
restrain that person from continuing the violation or 
from carrying out the threat. 
*** 
In this suit, the commissioner may obtain injunctions, 
prohibitory and mandatory, including temporary 
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, as the 
facts warrant *** 
 
Louisiana Revised Statute 30:16 states:   
 
If the commissioner fails to bring suit within ten days 
to restrain a violation as provided in La. R.S. 30:14, 
any person in interest adversely affected by the 
violation who has notified the commissioner in writing 
 
 3. Guilbeau v. 2 Hess Corp., Inc., 854 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 4. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So.3d 246 (La. 2011) 
(the leading case on the subsequent purchaser doctrine).  If the damage was apparent 
at the time of sale, the purchaser presumably negotiated for a lower sales price. Eagle 
Pipe, So. 3d at 275 (“it is assumed the apparent damage would result in a loss of 
value to the sale, the subsequent purchaser may have a claim in redhibition against 
the seller.”). 
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of the violation or threat thereof and has requested the 
commissioner to sue, may bring suit to prevent any or 
further violations, in the district court of any parish in 
which the commissioner could have brought suit. If the 
court holds that injunctive relief should be granted, the 
commissioner shall be made a party and shall be 
substituted for the person who brought the suit and the 
injunction shall be issued as if the commissioner had at 
all times been the complaining party. 
 
The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that these citizen suit 
provisions are designed only to combat ongoing and threatened 
violations of the conservation laws, not to provide a remedy for past 
violations.  Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes issued a report rejecting 
that argument and recommending that the court deny the motions to 
dismiss.  In his report, he relied in part on the Louisiana First Circuit’s 
decision in Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, 
Inc.5  In addition, the Magistrate’s report cited a footnote in the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.  In 
that footnote, the Court stated in dicta:  
 
We note that one of the reasons we granted this writ 
was to determine whether a subsequent purchaser has 
the right to sue for property damages that occurred 
before he purchased the property, particularly where 
the damage was not overt. However, we need not reach 
that determination in this case because, assuming the 
Breauxs had a right as a subsequent purchaser to sue in 
tort for property damage, that right has prescribed. 
Further, we note that regardless of who has standing to 
pursue claims for money damages, the current owner 
of property always has the right to seek a regulatory 
cleanup of a contaminated site. La. R.S. 30:6(F); La. 
R.S. 30:16.6   
 
 5. Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 2018-0093 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 11/6/2018), 2018 WL 5816971.  That decision, by a divided First Circuit 
panel, denied the defendants’ exception of no cause of action. 
 6. Marin, 48 So.3d at 256 n. 18. 
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Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P.7 is almost identical to Guilbeau, which 
is discussed immediately above.  In Tureau, a landowner filed suit 
seeking remediation of contamination arising from oil and gas 
activities prior to his purchase of the property.  The landowner 
previously had filed a suit seeking a clean-up based on the defendants’ 
obligations under the Louisiana Mineral Code.  That earlier suit was 
dismissed based on the subsequent purchaser doctrine.8  In the current 
action, the landowner seeks injunctive relief—an order requiring a 
remediation—in a citizen suit brought pursuant to Louisiana Revised 
Statutes 30:14 and 30:16.  The defendants filed motions to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that 
these citizen suit provisions are designed only to combat ongoing and 
threatened violations of the conservation laws, not as a remedy for past 
violations.  Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes issued a report rejecting 
that argument and recommending that the court deny the motions to 
dismiss.  
 
B. Lease Royalty Dispute 
 
1. Lease Basing Royalties on Market Value at the Well, While 
Making Lessee Responsible for Most Production Costs, was 
Ambiguous 
 
In AWT Be Good LLC v. Chesapeake, L.P.,9 AWT Be Good 
LLC granted an oil and gas lease, which provided that except when 
natural gas was sold at the well, the royalty on gas would be based on 
the market value at the well.  A few months later, the lease was 
assigned to Chesapeake Louisiana.  In 2010, the parties amended the 
lease.  The amendment provided that the lessee would be responsible 
for many post-production costs but not “long-haul transportation 
charges to the point of sale of the royalty gas.”  Later, AWT brought 
suit, asserting that Chesapeake was improperly charging AWT with a 
 
 7. Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 2019 WL 1230976 (W.D. La.) 
 8. Tureau v. 2 H, Inc., 2016 WL 4500755 (W.D. La. 2016). 
 9. AWT Be Good LLC v. Chesapeake, L.P., 2019 WL 177946 (W.D. La. 2019). 
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portion of pipeline capacity charges when Chesapeake did not use the 
entire pipeline capacity that it reserved.   
Both sides moved for summary judgment, but the court held 
that neither side was entitled to summary judgment.  The court 
concluded that the lease was ambiguous for multiple reasons.  For 
example, the lease did not make it clear what constituted “long-haul 
transportation charges.”  Further, the parties had amended the lease to 
make the lessee responsible for many types of post-production costs, 
but the parties had not amended the portion of the royalty clause that 
provided that the royalty on gas will be based on the market value at 
the well, even though “market value at the well” implies that the 
parties will each bear a share of post-production costs.  Additionally, 
neither party has submitted summary judgment evidence sufficient to 
make it clear exactly how Chesapeake’s contracts with the pipeline 
companies worked or how Chesapeake determined the amount of 
capacity charge that would be allocated to AWT.  
 
2. Letters Informing Lessees of Change in Lessor and Requesting 
Reissuance of Past Royalty Checks were Not Sufficient to Constitute 
a Mineral Code article 137 Notice 
 
Louisiana Oil & Gas Interests, LLC v. Shell Trading (U.S.) 
Co.10 was a royalty dispute.  Properties-General LLC owned the 
lessor’s interest under an oil and gas lease held by Shell Trading and 
Gulfport Energy.  Properties-General transferred its interest to 
Louisiana Oil & Gas Interests, LLC in late December 2013.   
On January 17, 2014, Louisiana Oil & Gas sent a letter to Shell 
requesting that future royalty checks be made payable to it.  Within a 
few days, Shell responded with an email requesting that Louisiana Oil 
& Gas provide Shell with a copy of a recorded document in which 
Properties-General transferred its interest to Louisiana Oil & Gas. 
On February 21, 2014, Louisiana Oil & Gas recorded a copy 
of the document effecting the transfer into the conveyance records of 
Cameron Parish, but months went by without Louisiana Oil & Gas 
sending a copy of the document to Shell.  Shell continued to issue 
royalty checks made out to Properties-General.  According to 
 
 10. Louisiana Oil & Gas Interests, LLC v. Shell Trading (U.S.) Co., 2019 WL 
1768296 (W.D. La.). 
  
234 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 6 
 
Louisiana Oil & Gas, it shared an owner with Properties-General, and 
for a while, Louisiana Oil & Gas’s bank had allowed the company to 
deposit the checks, even though the checks were made out to a separate 
company.  However, Louisiana Oil & Gas later changed banks, and 
the new bank would not let the company deposit the checks. 
On April 21, 2015, Louisiana Oil & Gas faxed to Shell a 
certified copy of the document transferring the interest and showing 
that the document had been filed in the conveyance records. 
On April 23, 2015, Louisiana Oil & Gas returned to Shell two 
checks that were made out to Properties-General.  Louisiana Oil & 
Gas requested that the two checks be reissued to it.  Each of the checks 
was dated prior to the April 21 fax. 
On June 1, 2015, Shell reissued the two checks.   
On September 1, 2015, Louisiana Oil & Gas sent a demand to 
Shell requesting payment of damages pursuant to Louisiana Mineral 
Code article 31:140. 
Shell and Gulfport filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, and 
Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay issued a report recommending that the 
motions be granted.  She noted that under Mineral Code article 137, 
before a lessor asserts a claim for the underpayment, nonpayment, or 
late payment of royalties, the lessor must give the lessee written notice 
of such failure and wait thirty days.  The remedy for which a lessor 
who brings suit and proves he was not properly paid depends on the 
lessee’s response to the required written notice that the lessee has not 
properly paid royalties. 
Here, the January 17, 2014 letter could not constitute a notice 
of failure to properly pay royalties because the letter addressed future 
royalties, not past royalties that had not been timely and properly paid.  
Further, the plaintiff’s April 23, 2015 fax did not actually allege that 
royalties had not been properly and timely paid.  The letter requested 
that the checks be reissued, but that request fell short of an assertion 
that the royalties had not been properly paid.  Accordingly, Louisiana 
Oil & Gas never sent a Mineral Code article 137 demand before Shell 
paid the royalties with its June 1, 2015 check. 
 
C. Meaning of “minerals” in Instrument Creating Servitude—
Servitude that Applied to “all forms of minerals” Applied to Clay 
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In Citrus Realty, LLC v. Parker,11 the defendants owned an 
undivided 10% in certain land in Plaquemines Parish.  They sold their 
10% ownership interest to Citrus but reserved a mineral servitude.  
The act of sale reserved the defendants’ rights relating to “all forms of 
minerals, including oil gas” but provided that the defendants would 
have no surface use rights.  However, they could “explore for minerals 
by offsite directional drilling or other means not involving the surface 
of the property.”  White Oak Realty later acquired ownership of the 
90% interest in the land not owned by Citrus. 
White Oak and Citrus later began to conduct clay mining 
operations on the land.  The defendants asserted their right to a portion 
of the proceeds, pursuant to their servitude for 10% of all minerals.  
Citrus filed an action for a declaratory judgment that the defendants’ 
servitude did not extend to the clay.  White Oak later joined the suit as 
an additional plaintiff.   
The plaintiffs argued that the language in the act of sale that 
barred the defendants from using the surface was intended to limit the 
servitude to minerals that can be produced by directional drilling.  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and 
the defendants appealed. The appellate court reversed, rejecting the 
argument that the restriction on surface use also had the effect of 
limiting the minerals to which the servitude applied.  The appellate 
court reasoned that the reservation of a right to “all forms of minerals” 
applied to clay.   
The appellate court also noted that certain additional 
justifications given by the trial court for its judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs were simply erroneous.  For example, the trial court had 
reasoned that because prescription of nonuse is only interrupted by 
operations conducted by the servitude owner or someone operating on 
the servitude owner’s behalf, a servitude owner is not entitled to a 
share of production from someone else’s operations.  This is clearly 
wrong.  As noted by the appellate court, the provision in the Mineral 
Code that prescription of nonuse is only interrupted by operations 
conducted by the servitude owner (or someone operating on his 
behalf)12 has no bearing on the servitude owner’s right to a share of 
production. 
 
 11. Citrus Realty, LLC v. Parker, 2018-516 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/2019), 2019 
WL 385194 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2019). 
 12. LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:42 (2000) (“Except as provided in Articles 44 through 
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Therefore, the appellate court reversed the summary judgment 
granted in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the district 
court.   
 
D. Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act Does Not Create Personal 
Obligation 
 
In Quality Production Management, LLC v. ConocoPhillips 
Co.,13 Quality Production Management filed suit against 
ConocoPhillips and BHP Billiton Petroleum.  Quality alleged that 
ConocoPhillips and BHP are the owners of certain wells off the coast 
of Vermilion Parish.  At the request of Rooster Petroleum, the operator 
of record for the wells, Quality performed work and provided 
materials for which it was owed about $90,525.71, along with interest 
and reasonable attorneys fees, but Rooster went into bankruptcy.  
Quality asserted a privilege, pursuant to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien 
Act (“LOWLA”)14 and sought a money judgment against 
ConocoPhillips and BHP.  Those defendants moved to dismiss the 
claims for a money judgment against them, asserting that there was no 
privity of contract between them and Quality, and that LOWLA does 
not create personal liability.  Rather, LOWLA provides in rem liability 
only against the wells and leases on which a claimant performs work 
or provides material or equipment.  Magistrate Judge Whitehurst 
agreed and issued a report recommending dismissal of the portion of 
Quality’s claim that seeks to impose personal liability against 
ConocoPhillips and BHP.  
E. Prescription of Nonuse: Creation of Unit with Shut-In Well 
Capable of Production in Paying Quantities Interrupts Prescription 
of Nonuse for Mineral Royalty Even Though Production Test was a 
Different Type Test Than Necessary to Satisfy Regulations 
 
52, use of a mineral servitude must be by the owner of the servitude, his 
representative or employee, or some other person acting on his behalf.”) Title 31 of 
the Louisiana Revised Statutes is known as the “Louisiana Mineral Code.” The 
provisions of the Mineral Code may be cited as “articles” of the Code or as 
“sections” of Title 31 of the Revised Statutes. LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:1 (2000) (“Thus 
Article 30 of the Louisiana Mineral Code may also be referred to or cited as R.S. 
31:30.”).   
 13. Quality Production Management, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2019 WL 
516125 (W.D. La.). 
 14. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:4863 (2007). 
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George M. Gilmer, Jr. granted a mineral royalty to Regal 
Energy, L.L.C. covering land in DeSoto Parish on April 1, 2018.15  
The instrument granting the royalty provided that the royalty would 
be subject to a three-year prescriptive period, but that the presence of 
a shut-in well would “perpetuate the term” of the royalty.   
XTO Energy, Inc. drilled a well (the “Brown Well”) on the 
property and (through an oilfield service company) performed an 
open-flow surface production test in late January 2009, flaring natural 
gas during the test.  The test showed that the Brown Well was capable 
of producing gas in paying quantities.  The Brown Well became the 
unit well but was shut-in because of the lack of a pipeline.  On April 
30, 2011, Chesapeake Operating, Inc. established production from an 
alternate unit well.   
Gilmer filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
mineral royalty had terminated by prescription of nonuse16 before that 
production began.  Gilmer contended that production from the Brown 
Well did not interrupt prescription because the hydrocarbons produced 
during the test of the well were flared, not saved and used. He also 
noted that production from Chesapeake’s alternate well did not start 
until more than three years after the royalty was created.   
Relevant Mineral Code provisions include articles 87, 88, 90, 
and 91.  These provide: 
 
Min. Code art. 87. Production as interruption of 
prescription; commencement of prescription anew 
 
Prescription of nonuse running against a mineral 
royalty is interrupted by the production of any mineral 
covered by the act creating the royalty. Prescription is 
interrupted on the date on which actual production 
begins and commences anew from the date of cessation 
of actual production. 
 
 
 15. Gilmer v. Principle Energy, L.L.C., 52,281 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/2018), 256 
So. 3d 1139. 
 16. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3448 (2007) (stating that “Prescription of nonuse is 
a mode of extinction of a real right other than ownership as a result of failure to 
exercise the right for a period of time.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:27 (2000) (listing 
“prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years” as one mode of extinction for 
mineral servitudes).  
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Min. Code art. 88. Saved production sufficient to 
interrupt prescription 
 
To interrupt prescription it is not necessary that 
minerals be produced in paying quantities but only that 
they actually be produced and saved. 
 
Min. Code art. 90. Tested shut-in well as 
interruption of prescription 
When there exists on a tract of land burdened by a 
mineral royalty, or on a conventional or compulsory 
unit that includes all or part thereof, a shut-in well 
proved through testing by surface production to be 
capable of producing minerals in paying quantities, 
prescription is interrupted on the date production is 
obtained by such testing. If only a part of the tract 
burdened by the royalty is included in a unit and the 
unit well is on land other than that burdened by the 
royalty, the interruption of prescription extends only to 
that portion of the tract burdened by the royalty 
included in the unit. Prescription commences anew 
from the date on which the well is shut in after such 
testing. 
 
Min. Code art. 91. Unitization with tested shut-in 
well; effect as interruption of prescription 
 
If the land or part thereof, burdened by a mineral 
royalty is included in a conventional or compulsory 
unit on which there is a well shut in prior to the creation 
of the unit, located on other land within the unit, and 
capable of producing in paying quantities as required 
by Article 90, prescription is interrupted on and 
commences anew from the effective date of the order 
or act creating the unit. 
 
The trial court held that, because production was not saved 
during the testing of the Brown Well, prescription was not interrupted 
pursuant to article 90.  However, the court held that prescription was 
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interrupted, pursuant to article 91, when the Brown Well was named 
the unit well. The district court rejected Gilmer’s argument that 
because XTO had not conducted a type of production test required 
under Office of Conservation regulations,17 the production test had not 
counted for purposes of Mineral Code article 91.   
The Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
summary judgment dismissing Gilmer’s suit.  The appellate court 
basically followed the reasoning of the trial, stating its conclusion that 
because hydrocarbons were not saved during the production test, the 
test did not interrupt prescription pursuant to Mineral Code articles 87 
or 90.18  On the other hand, pursuant to article 91, “prescription was 
interrupted on, and commenced anew, from the effective date of the 
order . . . creating the unit.”19  Like the trial court, the appellate court 
rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the testing of the well did not 
count for purposes of Mineral Code articles 90 and 91 because of the 
operator’s failure to perform the type of test required by certain 
regulations. 
 
F. Mineral Code article 206 Obligation Applies to Person Who 
Holds Lease at Time It Terminates, Rather Than to All Persons Who 
Ever Held Lease 
 
In the early 1970s, the Pardee Company sold several tracts of 
land to the predecessor of Weyerhaeuser Co.20  In the sale, Pardee 
reserved a mineral servitude over each tract.  Pardee granted a mineral 
lease covering portions of the land in 2001.  The original lessee 
assigned the lease to EP Energy E&P Co., which established unit 
production for units that included portions of the land.  Weyerhaeuser 
filed suit asserting that the servitude at issue had terminated by 
prescription of nonuse before EP established production.  
Weyerhaeuser demanded that several parties, including EP, execute a 
recordable act evidencing termination of their mineral rights.  EP 
declined to do so.  Weyerhaeuser filed suit seeking a declaration that 
 
 17. One of the regulations governing well testing is LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 
XIX, § 119 (West, Westlaw through rules pub. in La. Reg. Vol. 45, No. 09, Sept.  
20, 2019). 
 18. Mineral Code article 90 (LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:90) does not explicitly require 
that production be saved in order for testing to interrupt prescription. 
 19. Gilmer v. Principle Energy, 256 So. 3d 1139, 1145 (La. App. 2018).  
 20. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Pardee Minerals, LLC, 2018 WL 5624312 (W.D. La.).   
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the mineral rights had terminated.  Weyerhaeuser also sought attorney 
fees, pursuant to Mineral Code article 206, because of the defendants’ 
failure to acknowledge the termination of their mineral rights.  The 
district court rejected Weyerhaeuser’s claim against EP for attorney 
fees.  The court interpreted Mineral Code article 206 as imposing a 
duty only on the person who owns a mineral right at the time the right 
terminates, not on all persons who ever owned the mineral interest. 
 
G. Pooling Issues--Unleased Owner Not Responsible for Post-
Production Costs 
 
In Johnson v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP,21 parties disputed 
whether the operator of a compulsory drilling unit can charge an 
unleased owner with a proportionate share of post-production costs.  
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana 
held that such an operator cannot. 
Louisiana Revised Statute Section 30:10(A)(2) states, “In the 
event pooling is required, the cost of development and operation of the 
pooled unit chargeable to the owners therein shall be determined and 
recovered as provided herein.”  Section 30:10(A)(3) provides that 
owners of unleased mineral rights in a tract in a unit are liable, out of 
production, for their “tract's allocated share of the actual reasonable 
expenditures” incurred by the unit operator in drilling the well and 
producing oil or gas.  The statute does not expressly address post-
production costs that the operator may incur in handling and 
transporting oil or gas prior to selling it. 
Nevertheless, unit operators often incur such post-production 
costs in handling and arranging the sale of hydrocarbons attributable 
to unleased interests, particularly if a unit well produces natural gas.  
This occurs because many owners of unleased interests do not make 
their own arrangements to sell the portion of gas attributable to the 
tracts in which they own interests.  In such circumstances, the operator 
has authority to sell the gas attributable to the unleased interests, 
subject to an obligation to account to the owners of the interests.  
Typically, operators choose to exercise that authority because the 
alternative of letting an unleased owner’s share of gas accumulate is 
not practical.   
 
 21. Johnson v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La.). 
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Post-production costs that operators commonly incur include 
expenses for treating and compressing gas and transporting it to the 
place of sale.  This leads to the question disputed in Johnson.  Namely, 
if the unit operator sells natural gas attributable to an unleased interest, 
is the owner of that interest responsible for a proportionate share of 
the post-production costs reasonably incurred by the operator in 
handling the gas?  In Johnson, the operator (Chesapeake) argued that 
it was entitled to charge the unleased owner with a proportionate share 
of these costs.  Otherwise, the unleased owners would be unjustly 
enriched at Chesapeake’s expense. 
 
The court rejected that argument, noting that 30:10(A)(3) 
states:  
If there is included in any unit created by the 
commissioner of conservation one or more unleased 
interests for which the party or parties entitled to 
market production therefrom have not made 
arrangements to separately dispose of the share of such 
production attributable to such tract, and the unit 
operator proceeds with the sale of unit production, then 
the unit operator shall pay to such party or parties such 
tract's pro rata share of the proceeds of the sale of 
production within one hundred eighty days of such 
sale. 
 
Chesapeake argued that the only purpose of 30:10(A)(3) is to 
set a deadline for payment, not to govern liability for post-production 
costs.  The court held otherwise.  Section 30:10 does not define “pro 
rata share,” but the court concluded that it means a pro rata portion of 
gross proceeds from which the operator may subtract only the costs 
that Section 30:10 expressly authorizes the operator to recover.  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the unleased 
owners, holding that Chesapeake may not charge them with a share of 




A. Co-ownership and Authority to Operate – La. Acts 2019, No. 350 
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When more than one person owns a working interest in the 
same land, a question sometimes arises regarding what level of 
consent is needed to authorize oil and gas operations.22  In other words, 
do operations require the consent of all persons who own a working 
interest? 
The answer to this question is: “It depends.”  The existence of 
multiple working interest owners can arise in various ways.  The 
simplest is when land is co-owned and no mineral servitudes or 
mineral leases exist.  The Mineral Code does not address this situation, 
but Civil Code article 801 states: “The use and management of the 
thing held in indivision is determined by agreement of all the co-
owners.”  This has been interpreted as meaning that the consent of all 
co-owners of the land generally is required in order to authorize 
operations23 with a narrow exception being that Civil Code article 800 
allows a co-owner to “take necessary steps for the preservation of the 
thing held in indivision” without the concurrence of other co-owners.  
Under Mineral Code article 177, a similar rule and similar exception 
apply if the land is subject to a mineral lease and the lessee’s interest 
is co-owned.     
However, different rules apply in three other situations—(1) if 
the land is subject to a mineral servitude that is co-owned, (2) the land 
is co-owned and one or more, but fewer than all, of the co-owners 
grant a mineral servitude, or (3) the land is co-owned or it is subject to 
a mineral servitude that is co-owned, and one or more (but fewer than 
all) of the co-owners grant a mineral lease.  In these three situations, 
the original version of the Mineral Code required the consent of all 
working interest owners, but that requirement has been loosened.24   
The first “loosening” occurred in 1986.  Acts 1986, No. 1047 
amended Mineral Code article 164 to provide that if a co-owner of 
land creates a mineral servitude that burdened his interest, the 
servitude owner can operate, provided that such owner acquires the 
consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided 90% interest in the 
land (the fractional interest of the co-owner who created the servitude 
 
 22. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 136 So. 1, 2 (La. 1931) (owner of mineral 
servitude for one-half of minerals erroneously contended that it needed consent of 
landowner); cf. Huckabay v. Tex. Co., 78 So. 2d 829 (La. 1955). 
 23. Cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 278 (La. 1919); Sun Oil Co. v. 
State Mineral Bd., 92 So. 2d 583, 586 (La. 1956); LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:177 (2000). 
 24. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 31:166, 31:175 (2000).   
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should count toward the total amount of consenting interests).  The 
same legislation amended Mineral Code article 166 to provide that if 
a co-owner of land creates a mineral lease covering his interest, the 
lessee may operate with the consent of co-owners owning at least an 
undivided 90% interest in the land.  Finally, the 1986 legislation 
amended Mineral Code article 175 to provide that if land is subject to 
a mineral servitude and the mineral servitude itself is co-owned, a co-
owner can conduct operations if co-owners owning at least an 
undivided 90% interest consent. 
The requirements were loosened further two years later, when 
Acts 1988, No. 647 amended Mineral Code articles 164, 166, and 175 
to lower the threshold in those three situations from 90% to 80%.   
Acts 2019, No. 350 amends Mineral Code articles 164, 166, 
and 175 to lower the threshold to 75%. 
 
B. Use of Oilfield Site Restoration Fund for Responding to 
Emergencies 
 
Acts 2019, No. 193 amended Louisiana Revised Statute 30:86 
to authorize use of money from the Oilfield Site Restoration Fund to 
respond to emergencies declared by the Commissioner of 
Conservation pursuant to Revised Statute 30:6.1.  Act No. 193 also 
amends Revised Statue 30:93.1 to provide that if money from the Fund 
is used to respond to an emergency, the Commissioner must seek 
recovery of those funds from any party that has operated or held a 
working interest in the site where the emergency occurs. 
C.State Leases—Including a Provision for a Security Interest 
Acts 2019, No. 403 provides that the State Mineral and Energy 
Board may include a clause that grants a security interest in minerals 
produced pursuant to the lease (or lands pooled therewith and 
attributable to the leased premises) in state mineral leases issued after 
July 31, 2019 to secure the lessee’s obligation to pay lease royalties or 
other sums due under the lease. 
The motivation for this amendment relates to the fact that 
Louisiana law classifies an oil and gas as a type of lease25—in contrast 
to the laws of some other states, which do not classify oil and gas 
leases as true leases (as the term “lease” is used in landlord tenant 
 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2671 (2019). 
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law).26  Therefore, a mineral lessor’s royalty constitutes rent under 
Louisiana law.27  Because the lessor’s royalty constitutes rent, the 
Mineral Code article 146 “lessor’s lien,” which is designed to secure 
the payment of the royalty, may be rendered unenforceable by 11 
U.S.C. § 545 when a lessee is in bankruptcy.28  Certain state officials 
were concerned that Louisiana needed to find a way to secure payment 
of the royalties to which it is entitled under oil and gas leases granted 
by the State.29 
 
 
 26. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2003) (“In 
Texas it has long been recognized that an oil and gas lease is not a ‘lease’ in the 
traditional sense of a lease of the surface of real property.”); In re Topco, 894 F.2d 
727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The term ‘lease,’ when used in an oil and gas context, 
is a misnomer. The estate created by the oil and gas lease is not the same as those 
interests created under a ‘lease’ governed by the law of landlord and tenant”); 
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL AND GAS 
LAW § 202.1 (“The very name ‘lease’ is unfortunate inasmuch as it tends to give the 
impression to the uninformed that the relationship arising between the parties to an 
oil and gas lease is the same as that of landlord and tenant under as [sic] common 
law lease of land, whereas except in Louisiana, the dissimilarities are more important 
than the similarities.”). 
 27. LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:123 (2000). 
 28. See e.g., In re WRT Energy Corp., 169 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 29. The author served on a committee appointed by the Louisiana Law Institute, 
at the request of the Louisiana legislature, to address this issue. 
